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By many accounts, we have entered an era of unprecedented 
contentiousness in debtor-creditor relations. For an example of the 
new status quo, consider the recent actions of PetSmart, a 
perfectly normal American corporation struggling with debt from 
a leveraged buyout gone sour. The textbook account of corporate 
governance would suggest that PetSmart’s board of directors 
would respond to this financial distress by seeking to improve the 
underlying business or, perhaps, by filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy to maximize the value of the firm for the benefit of 
creditors. Instead, PetSmart’s board authorized a transaction that 
seems shocking for a firm in its situation: It took $1.5 billion out 
of the reach of creditors, distributing about $900 million to its 
shareholders and placing $750 million in a subsidiary that was not 
an obligor on its $9 billion in debt. 
This type of scorched-earth maneuvering is a form of 
“bankruptcy hardball.” To be sure, distressed companies and their 
major financial creditors have always had their share of combative 
negotiations, conflict, and litigation. But the current level of chaos 
and rent-seeking is unprecedented. It is now routine for distressed 
firms to engage in tactics that harm some creditors for the benefit 
of other stakeholders, often in violation of contractual promises 
and basic principles of corporate finance. It is quite revealing that, 
after PetSmart removed nearly $2 billion from the reach of 
creditors, the trading price of its bonds actually increased in value. 
The bondholders who were still harmed by the transaction likely 
breathed a sigh of relief because they had feared far worse. 
Although unthinkable only a few years ago, a distressed firm’s 
redistribution of nearly $2 billion away from its creditors is seen, 
in today’s environment, as unexpectedly generous to those same 
creditors because its private-equity owner did not help itself to 
more. 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Jared A. Ellias & Robert A. Stark, 
Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745 (2020). 
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The new environment is rooted, in part, in a series of recent 
Delaware court decisions that added up to a radical change in law: 
Creditors would no longer have the kind of common-law 
protections from opportunism that helped protect their bargain for 
the better part of two centuries. In these decisions—most 
importantly Gheewalla followed by Quadrant Structured 
Products2—the Delaware courts dramatically reduced the ability 
of creditors of insolvent firms to prosecute claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty. To be sure, other factors have contributed to the 
status quo, such as debt-market conditions, a loosening of the 
basket of traditional covenants, and broader economic factors. But 
the common law’s retreat from protecting creditors has 
qualitatively changed the liability calculus for boards of directors 
of troubled firms.  
To illustrate the change, consider the advice that law firms 
provide to the boards of troubled companies. In an article for 
clients written in 2001, prior to Gheewalla, a leading law firm 
wrote that “[w]hen a corporation becomes insolvent, . . . [r]ather 
than pursuing high-risk strategies for the benefit of shareholders, 
directors must seek to protect creditors’ claims to corporate assets 
and earnings.”3 After Quadrant, a leading law firm wrote in a 
client alert that directors can now favor some creditors over others 
without having to worry about liability.4 Similarly, another 
leading law firm wrote that Quadrant will protect directors 
“adopting a high-risk business strategy that might benefit 
controlling shareholders when a corporation is insolvent.”5  
This revolution in the common law was premised on the faulty 
assumption that creditors are fully capable of protecting their 
 
2 Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2014); 
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 
(Del. 2007). 
3 See J. Douglas Bacon & Jennifer A. Love, When Good Things Happen 
to Bad People: Practical Aspects of Holding Directors and Managers of 
Insolvent Corporations Accountable, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 185, 186 
(2001). 
4 See John L. Reed & Henry duPont Ridgley, Delaware Court of 
Chancery Issues Significant Ruling on the Ability of Creditors to Assert 
Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Directors: Key Takeaways, DLA PIPER 
(May 14, 2015). 
5 See Mark S. Chehi, Delaware Court of Chancery Decision Clarifies 
Fiduciary Issues in Insolvent Company Context, SKADDEN (Jan. 2015). 
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bargain during periods of distress with contracts and bankruptcy 
law. The reality is contrary to that undergirding assumption, for 
several reasons.  
First, the creditor’s bargain often is an easy target for 
opportunistic repudiation and, in turn, dashed expectations once 
distress sets in. Even the most sophisticated creditors cannot 
protect themselves with contract law alone. They cannot foresee 
every contingency ex ante, and skilled debtor’s lawyers can often 
find ways to get around even carefully written contracts. For 
example, the bondholders of Forest Oil contracted ex ante for 
redemption in the event of a change in control—only to see the 
debtor claim it “contracted around” that covenant even though the 
firm had, in fact, been sold to a new controller.  
Second, while bankruptcy law does protect creditors, it also 
answers to other policy goals, such as reorganizing distressed 
firms and protecting jobs. And well-advised debtors and creditors 
can run strategic and smart bankruptcy processes that use 
procedural tools to pressure the judge into making decisions that 
further the policy goal of say, promoting reorganization, even at 
the expense of vindicating creditor rights. Bankrupt 
LyondellBassell’s managers, for example, exploited an odd quirk 
of bankruptcy law to settle valuable fraudulent-transfer claims 
worth potentially billions, without, initially, the input of the 
unsecured creditors who were the real plaintiffs. Bankruptcy law 
can protect the rights of creditors, but it can also be used to take 
rights away from creditors that they would have had outside of 
bankruptcy. This sort of bankruptcy hardball may help explain 
why PetSmart’s board decided to make such an opportunistic 
distribution of value: with funds already in hand, the firm’s 
private-equity sponsor became better positioned to get more than 
it might be entitled to at the conclusion of a bankruptcy process or 
out-of-court restructuring. 
Although the Delaware courts have paved the way for 
bankruptcy hardball to become the de facto mode of distressed 
governance, judges can help fix the problem by pushing back 
against overreach. Gheewalla is not the only force that has 
reshaped debtor-creditor relations. Perpetually favorable debt-
market conditions in the years after the financial crisis have 
reduced the bargaining power of debt investors and emboldened 
managers, and the rise of hedge funds and claims trading has 
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changed the administration of Chapter 11. The status quo could be 
improved if today’s standards were applied more rigorously.  
State and federal judges adjudicating contract disputes should 
consider whether management’s proposed course of action is a 
reasonable, good-faith display of business judgment that promises 
to maximize the value of the firm. Even in the absence of an 
explicit duty that shifts to creditors, many commentators and 
courts believe that managers continue to owe their fiduciary duty 
in the first instance to the firm, not to shareholders directly. To 
illustrate, consider lawsuits filed by creditors against a firm’s 
board for violating covenants. While courts often consider these 
to be contracts cases, it is easy to imagine how a fiduciary-duty 
analysis could, consistent with Gheewalla and Quadrant, be 
grafted on top. Courts can consider the board’s level of analysis 
in connection with the disputed action and whether it was really 
taken in good faith. Similarly, courts can view more skeptically 
the technical arguments that a company complied with the letter 
of a debt contract in a way that clearly violates the intended spirit 
of the contractual covenant. In this way, management would be 
restrained by having to justify conduct under more searching 
judiciary scrutiny. While a more aggressive application of the 
business-judgment rule would not eliminate bankruptcy hardball, 
it would likely deter the most egregious cases. 
Additionally, fraudulent-transfer litigation has been devalued 
as an insolvency remedy. This kind of action currently takes a very 
long time to litigate, and courts should be mindful of litigation 
duration in scheduling hearings and ruling on fraudulent-transfer 
motions. The slow-moving trains of justice embolden the entire 
private-equity industry to extract excessive dividends from 
portfolio firms, knowing that any fraudulent-transfer action might 
take more than a decade to litigate, by which time most employees 
currently at the private-equity firm will be gone. Bankruptcy 
judges also should also consider whether fraudulent-transfer law 
needs to operate more aggressively, mindful of Gheewalla and the 
spate of opportunism since the financial crisis. 
Finally, bankruptcy judges need to be more assertive in the 
face of demands from management that certain liquidation is the 
only alternative to a course of action that benefits one stakeholder 
over another. There is no reason to think that debtor-in-possession 
financing would really dry up if bankruptcy judges announced 
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they would not allow such financings to limit the investigative 
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